Giving an Account of Oneself: Architecturally by Rendell, J





In January 2013 I questioned my employer, UCL’s, decision to accept $10 million of 
funding from the Anglo-Australian multinational mining and petroleum company 
BHP Billiton to create an International Energy Policy Institute in Adelaide, and the 
Institute for Sustainable Resources in London at the Bartlett Faculty of the Built 
Environment. At the time, I was Vice Dean of Research and my questions started a 
process which is figured here as a site-writing, articulated through two registers: bios 
– a set of diary entries noting personal anxieties and hopes related to my institutional 
role at UCL, and logos – an attempt to relate these issues to the development of my 
own intellectual work and concepts concerning ethics and critique generated by 
others. 
 




In 2014 Cornell University set up an ethics hotline using regulatory compliance 
software provided by US-based corporation EthicsPoint, Inc to provide ‘a simple, 
anonymous way to confidentially report activities that may involve certain improper 
conduct or violations of Cornell University’s Policies’.1 This is but one indication of 
how ethical concerns have risen up the agenda in current institutional cultures, 
manifest in universities as well as the built environment professions.  What we are 
witnessing is the creation of new ethical codes, policies, and procedures as well as the 
establishment of think tanks and commissions for debating ethical practice. My own 
‘practise of ethics’ began back in January 2013, when I questioned UCL’s decision to 
accept $10 million of funding from the Anglo-Australian multinational mining and 
petroleum company BHP Billiton to create an International Energy Policy Institute in 
Adelaide, and the Institute for Sustainable Resources in London at the Bartlett Faculty 
of the Built Environment, of which I was then Vice Dean of Research. My questions 
started a process which is figured here as a site-writing, articulated through two 
registers: bios – a set of diary entries noting personal anxieties and hopes related to 
my institutional role at UCL, and logos – an attempt to relate these issues to the 
development of my own intellectual work and concepts concerning ethics and critique 
generated by others (Rendell, 2010).  
 
January 2013 
The fear that woke my stomach, reaches my head. Wide-awake in a still-dark 
bedroom I realize that when morning comes I will have to outline the research I’ve 
conducted for UCL’s risk register. Tasked to ‘own’ the risk of research expansion, I 
have focused on UCL’s reputation as global researcher leader, and its academic 
reputation based on independence and integrity. I will suggest that one of the risks 
associated with research expansion, comes from accepting financial gifts from 
corporations, particularly where there are disparities between the practices of those 
corporations and UCL’s principles as published in its core principles and 
procedures. I am focusing in particular on UCL’s decision to accept funding from the 
charitable arm of BHP Billiton – one of the world’s largest mining corporations – in 
June 2011 to set up an Institute of Sustainable Resources (ISR) at UCL and position 
this inside the Bartlett in September 2012.2 If we follow the Brundtland Report of 
1987, which states that sustainable development must be ‘development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs’, then the mining of fossil fuels is unsustainable on two counts – first 
fossil fuels are a finite resource, and second, as published climate science evidences, 
the limit of the ecosystem to absorb CO2 has already been dangerously surpassed.3 I 
will argue that UCL is taking a risk with its reputation for independent research into 
sustainability, allowing BHP Billiton to buy legitimacy for the continued mining of 
fossil fuels and to potentially influence not only policy on sustainability, but also the 
definition of this contested term. I have judged the risk of potential damage to 
reputation to be significant enough to warrant purchasing a copy of report by 
RepRisk on BHP Billiton.4 This report is a collection of media articles, which provide 
evidence of how far BHP Billiton, and so any company associated with them, is 
exposed to reputational risk. Along with other companies in the mining sector, BHP 
Billiton, is here categorised at the maximum risk level on environment principles, and 
exceeds other companies in reaching the highest level of risk in the areas of anti-
corruption, labour and human rights.5  
 
The (Post) Critical? 
In ‘Notes around the Doppler Effect and other Moods of Modernism’, Robert Somol 
and Sarah Whiting rejected the autonomous disciplinarity and oppositional dialectics 
of critical architecture, as represented by the work of critic Michael Hays and 
architect Peter Eisenman, which they described as ‘hot representation’, and instead 
advocated an architecture of ‘the diagrammatic, the atmospheric and cool 
performance’ (2002: 74).  At the time this paper established what appeared to be a 
dominant post-critical mood in architectural education, but it left many of us 
wondering otherwise. I asked myself, in Critical Architecture (2007), if, following 
Raymond Geuss (1981: 2), in turn following Karl Marx, critical theory can be defined 
in terms of self-reflectivity and the desire for social emancipation, then cannot any 
activity, which takes on these tasks be considered critical?  
 
February 2013 
Since government funding to cover teaching costs has been all but removed in the UK, 
increasing efforts are being made to attract a new income stream – corporate 
sponsorship. But with so much talk of business links and enterprise, there has been 
very little institutional acknowledgement of the shifts in culture occurring in 
universities as a result of the reduction of state funding and the introduction of loans 
for UK students at BA Level. Yet I am reminded that UCL is not a public university, 
but a chartered corporation.6 But if not public, UCL is still proud of its radical 
tradition, the fact that unlike Oxford and Cambridge it was not founded as a religious 
entity, and that it was the first British university to accept women students on the 
same basis as men and award degrees to women. In fact, quite recently, being radical 
has become key to our brand: a briefing from the communications team suggests that 
we should speak in a radical and open voice.  
 
Critical Spatial Practice 
In Art and Architecture: A Place Between (2006) I coined the term ‘critical spatial 
practice’ to define modes of self-reflective artistic and architectural practice which 
seek to question and to transform the social conditions of the sites into which they 
intervene.  Through the process of writing the book I came to understand that my own 
position between art, architecture and critical theory was constantly changing and 
influenced the interpretative accounts I was able to offer. I concluded Art and 
Architecture by arguing that the writing of criticism is itself a form of situated 
practice, one that is critical and spatial.7  
 
March 2013 
Before dawn, almost every night now, I am jolted awake, surprised and disorientated 
for a second or two; then I remember, and the panic rears up through me. Will 
fighting this battle, pitting myself against my institution, loose me my job? Has UCL 
done its homework, and even if it has, will the right governance structures and due 
diligence procedures really be able to protect the independence of academic 
research? UCL has argued that we must engage with businesses in order to change 
them. But I still can’t grasp the stated logic, that, on the one hand, when the funding 
is at arm’s length, the giver of the gift – in this case a charitable donation – should 
not influence the research that is funded by the gift it has given, but that, on the other 
hand, the receiver of the gift should influence the activities of the giver.  
 
Relational Critique  
If criticism can be defined by the purpose of providing a commentary on a cultural 
work then criticism always has an ‘other’ in mind. The central task of criticism might 
then be considered as: how does one relate to an ‘other’? Grounded in the object 
relations theory of D. W. Winnicott, the psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin (1988: xii) 
argues that the central task of psychoanalysis is the ‘double task of recognition: how 
analyst and patient make known their own subjectivity and recognize the other’s’.  
 
April 2013 
Did I really record him in his own office on my mobile phone? Was that wise? I asked 
him for permission, explaining that it was so I could remember exactly what he had 
said without having to take notes, and that the information would not go public. He 
agreed. I was very friendly about it. So was he. So maybe it is all fine ... But trying to 
find these documents has turned me into a researcher of my own institution. Did it set 
up a note of mistrust, having the phone there on the desk, between us? What if a 
colleague who had come to talk to me, on a complex and tricky issue, had asked to 
record me? Would I be fine about it?  
 
Institutional Critique 
Benjamin Buchloh (1990) coined the term ‘institutional critique’ to describe a strand 
of conceptual practice developed through the work of artists such as Hans Haacke and 
Michael Asher in the 1960s and 1970s.  In the Claire Copley Gallery, Los Angeles 
(1974), for example, Asher removed the partition between the office and exhibition 
space, revealing to the public viewer the usually hidden operations that allow the 
gallery to function economically (Buchloh, 1984: 76-84).  
 
May 2013 
I am so angry I can barely breathe. I am expected to back decisions that have been 
made without consulting me. I always knew the Vice Dean role came with 
responsibility, but I never really understood the implications and potential 
contradictions of holding such a title until now. It is hard not to wonder if I was 
excluded from the decision-making process because I am a woman? But perhaps not, 
as along with the five men who signed the partnership between UCL and BHP Billiton 
there was one woman. 
 
Site-Writing  
Feminists, such as Donna Haraway (1988), have developed conceptual tools such as 
‘standpoint theory’ and ‘situated knowledge’, for exploring how ways of knowing and 
being are culturally and spatially constructed. Site-writing is the name I have given to 
a practice I have initiated which draws attention to the situatedness of critical 
knowledge.8 I am interested in how criticism as a practice performs acts of 
interpretation, produced by, and in turn productive of, the changing positions and sites 
we occupy – materially, conceptually, emotionally and ideologically – as critics.  Site-
writing responds to Howard Caygill’s (1988: 34, 64, 79) notion of strategic critique 
where a position of judgement is advanced through the process of criticizing, and 
parallels Gavin Butt’s (2005: 7) ‘call for … a mode of contemporary criticality’ which 
is ‘apprehended within – and instanced as – the performative act of critical 
engagement itself’.  
 
June 2013 
As Vice Dean of Research, and having been tasked in January 2013 to 'own' the risk of 
research expansion, I suggested the need for the following three documents:  
1. The Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) due diligence procedures to be 
undertaken when deciding whether to accept the funds. 
2. The structures and procedures in place to protect academic independence and 
integrity. 
3. The performance indicators to monitor how this corporation has been changed by 




A key aspect of situated knowledge is the locatedness of personal experience, and the 
relation of one person’s knowledge, understanding and experience to another, which 
brings us very much into the field of life-writing, biography and autobiography. The 
oral historian Linda Sandino (2013: 9) draws on the work of Paul Ricoeur to consider 
how different forms of figuration operate in narration, relating the act of telling to the 
told, such that oral history might be itself understood as ‘a double interpretive 
operation in which the narrator recapitulates the told in the telling.’ Following 
Ricoeur, she describes: the individual in interpreting his or her life ‘appears both as a 
reader and writer,’ and the ‘story of a life continues to be refigured by all the truthful 
and fictive stories a subject tells about himself or herself…a life is not “how it was” 
but how it is interpreted and reinterpreted, told and re-told’ (Sandino, 2013: 9). And in 
the feminist figurations of Donna Haraway and Rosi Braidotti spatial arrangements 
are an intrinsic aspect of their story-telling function; specifically the role of actual 
locations, and the cartographies of power relations and the differing positionalities 
they generate. Braidotti writes: 
 
Figurations are not mere metaphors, but rather markers of more concretely 
situated historical positions. A figuration is the expression of one’s specific 
positioning in space and time. It marks certain territorial or geopolitical 
coordinates, but it also points out one’s sense of genealogy of historical 
inscription. Figurations deterritorialize and destabilize the certainties of the 
subject and allow for a proliferation of situated or ‘micro’ narratives of self 
and others. (1997: 11) 
 
July 2013 
The deed is done.  
On 1 July 2013 I formally ‘stepped down’ from my role as Vice Dean of Research for 
the Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment, UCL at a meeting of the Research 
Advisory Group (RAG) of which I was chair. 
But what does that mean?  
I think it means that I’ve withdrawn my consent and refused to collaborate.  
I believe it is the ‘right’ thing to have done, but has it been the most effective way to 
influence the situation? 
 
Critique as Crisis  
Roland Barthes (1982 [1971]: 379) comments that ‘to criticize means to call into 
crisis’. To consider critique as crisis closely mirrored my state of mind when I chose 
to step down, so fearful was I of institutional repercussions. I was in crisis at the time, 
doubting my actions, and feeling panic going through me like electricity each time I 
spoke out.  
 
July 2013 
Following my formal act of ‘stepping-down’, I met various senior managers at UCL 
to discuss my decision. To my surprise they all showed support for the work I had 
been doing on reputational risk and expressed an interest in involving me in 
developing UCL’s ethical procedures and structures. In an act of what I now see as a 
‘stepping up’, I put forward several proposals for action – that I would: 
 
1. Prepare a report, based on the BHP Billiton donation, on existing due diligence 
procedures and performance indicators in place at UCL, for accepting and 
monitoring funding from corporations for research. 
2. Help develop UCL’s ethical procedures for accepting and monitoring funding from 
corporations for research. 
3. Initiate a research project on the role of 'influence' in the corporate funding of 
university research – based on specific UCL case studies, for example the BHP 
Billiton donation.  
4. Draft a proposal for divestment in fossil fuel – looking at both those 
corporations/companies in which UCL invests its funds, and those 
corporations/companies from which UCL accepts gifts, donations, sponsorships, etc.  
5. Host a public debate on the funding of universities by fossil fuel corporations, to 
involve a range of speakers with diverse views on the topic.  
6. Write an academic article on competing narratives in the contested arena of 
sustainable communities. 
Constructive Institutional Critique 
Artist/architect Apolonija Šušteršic (1999: 56) has suggested that institutional critique 
‘doesn’t produce any constructive resolution, when it doesn’t effect changes in our 
political and cultural structures’. Her comment was made in conversation with the 
curator Maria Lind, who has put forward the idea of ‘constructive institutional 
critique’ to describe the work of Šušteršic and others, which, rather than being ‘based 
on negativity … offer[s] a proposal for change, possibly an improvement, or a test of 
how to do things slightly differently … based on dialogue between the artist and the 
institution, rather than an inherent conflict’ (Šušteršic , 1999: 56).  
 
December 2013  
Conducted under Chatham House Rules, and involving senior managers, academics, 
administrative staff, and students at UCL, I hosted Rich Seams or Dark Pools? Fossil 
Fuel Funding and University Research, a seminar where eight speakers addressed 
what is at stake when fossil fuel funds university research on sustainability. The title 
of the event referred to a tension between fossil fuel funding as a ‘rich seam’, an 
opportunity or resource to be exploited, but also a ‘dark pool’, adopting a term used 
to describe a source of unregulated financial exchange in the corporate world.9 
 
Transversality in the Group 
Winnicott’s idea of the transitional object that exists between mother and child was an 
inspiration for philosopher Félix Guattari’s concept of the institutional object in his 
work on transversality and psychiatry (Guattari 1984 [1964]: 20). Guattari (1996 
[1964]: 63) argues that dual relations are always triangular in character, noting that 
‘there is always in a real situation a mediating object that acts as an ambiguous 
support or medium’. Guattari calls this third factor the institutional object (Genosko, 
2002: 69). His philosophy proposes a new concept: ‘transversality in the group’, an 
‘unconscious source of action’, which carries a group’s desire, ‘a dimension opposite 
and complementary to the structures that generate pyramidal hierarchisation’ 
(Guattari 1984 [1964]: 18, 22). For Guattari transversality provides the possibility of 
bringing the ‘institutional context, its constraints, organization, practices, etc., all 
those things and relations which normally exist in the background’ into the 
foreground for critique (Genosko, 2002: 70). 
 
July 2014 
I have found others who are fascinated in a range of ethical issues, some with quite 
different perspectives to my own, but who also wish to look at the UCL’s governance 
structures guiding ethical issues, and at how ethics is configured through different 
practices and disciplines – pedagogical and professional – in built environment 
research. To pursue such interests, I have put together a research proposal for a 
year-long project, and applied –successfully – for some internal funding from the 
Bartlett Small Grants Scheme. As well as involving a participant from each part of the 
Bartlett, and advisors from across UCL, the project will employ researchers to map 
those areas of UCL, which engage specifically in ethics, involving discourse analysis, 
literature reviews, ethnographic interviews, and seminars, ending in June with a two-
day international conference, Practising Ethics, where speakers from academia and 
industry, including architects, artists, environmental scientists, fiction writers, and 
urban planners, will offer their ethical viewpoints through panel sessions and round 
tables.10  
 
The ‘art of not being governed quite so much’ 
In Judith Butler’s (2002: 212) close analysis of Michel Foucault’s 1978 lecture ‘What 
is Critique’ from The Politics of Truth, she notes how ‘critique is always a critique of 
some instituted practice, discourse, episteme, institution, and it loses it character the 
moment in which it is abstracted from its operation and made to stand alone as a 
purely generalizable practice’.  She talks of how, for Foucault, ‘critique is precisely a 
practice that not only suspends judgment …  but offers a new practice of values based 
on that very suspension’.  Butler points to the way in which the practice of critique 
emerges from ‘the tear in the fabric of our epistemological web’, and outlines that, for 
Foucault, this exposure of the limit of the epistemological field is linked with the 
practice of virtue, ‘as if virtue is counter to regulation and order, as if virtue itself is to 
be found in the risking of established order’.  According to Foucault, the ‘signature 
mark’ of the critical attitude and its particular virtue is governance, ‘how not to be 
governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an 
objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by 
them’. ‘I would therefore propose’, says Foucault (2007: 45), ‘as a very first 





March 2015  
Along with colleagues from the Bartlett, the Medical Faculty, Laws and the Institute 
of Global Health, we have decided to hold a debate in UCL on Divestment. At the end 
of the discussion we took a vote – the wish to divest from fossil fuels was almost 
unanimous.11 As part of the debate, I argued that UCL had three ethical reasons to 
divest from fossil fuels: first, that investment in fossil fuel companies is inconsistent 
with many of UCL’s strategies; second, that UCL’s own researchers have just 
produced a paper, which argues that certain percentages of fossil fuel reserves need 
to stay in the ground; and third, that since universities educate the young they have a 
special responsibility to their future.12  I also pointed to new economic arguments for 
divestment, for example, that if international agreements on climate change are met 
then investors, by supporting fossil fuel companies, will risk their financial assets 
becoming worthless. Such investments are creating a ‘carbon bubble’ worth trillions 
of dollars based on assets that could prove to be unusable, with coal now being 
viewed as a 'stranded asset'.13 I noted that, as Brett Scott has recently argued, the two 
approaches to divestment – ethical and economic – converge in three areas: firstly, in 
the campaign to broaden the notion of fiduciary duty; secondly, in the quest to 
redefine the time horizon in which investments should be assessed; and thirdly, in the 
battle to incorporate non-monetary returns and losses into investment assessments.14 
 
The Question of Who One Is 
Foucault understands ethical work to have both an intellectual and a practical 
dimension. For Foucault, according to Paul Rabinow (1997: xix), ‘who one is […] 
emerges acutely out of the problems with which one struggles’. Rabinow discusses 
how Foucault saw this as an attitude ‘rooted in an ethics and not a morality, a practice 
rather than a vantage point, an active experience, rather than a passive waiting’. 
 
January 2015 
Over the same time period that I was deliberating what it means for UCL to accept a 
financial gift from a fossil fuel company, UCL started to engage with the Research 
Concordat for Integrity, and review its own research ethics procedures.15 In tandem 
with UCL’s work in this area, and with the Dean of the Bartlett’s approval, I decided 
that the research project on ethics I was leading needed to transform itself into a 
working group and to establish a new approach for engaging with ethical issues in 
the Bartlett through research, but also teaching and enterprise. Starting with the 
Bartlett Faculty’s four key principles of autonomy, integrity, sustainability and equity, 
I am keen to set in motion an approach where the implications these principles raise 
is followed through in the ethical stance we take in our work as researchers, whether 
through partnering with corporations, interviewing subjects or conducting 
participatory action research. My aim is to set up a Bartlett Ethics Forum, and to 
place ethics as a key aspect of our pedagogy from the education of first year 
architects onwards, while also offering a training to staff and guidance to students on 
how to deliberate ethical dilemmas in their work as built environment professionals, 
with the hope of following up and developing the work done by the Edge 
Commission.16  
 
Giving an Account of Oneself 
In Giving an Account of Oneself Butler (2005: 8) argues that ‘the “I” has no story of 
its own that is not also the story of a relation – or set of relations – to a set of norms’. 
She goes on to note that: ‘If the “I” is not at one with moral norms’, this means that 
‘the subject must deliberate upon these norms’, and that part of such a deliberation 
will ‘entail a critical understanding’ of the social genesis and meaning of those norms. 
Butler writes: 
 
In this sense ethical deliberation is bound up with the operation of critique. 
And critique finds that it cannot go forward without a consideration of how the 
deliberating subject comes into being and how a deliberating subject might 
actually live or appropriate a set of norms. Not only does ethics find itself 
embroiled in the task of social theory, but social theory, if it is to yield 
nonviolent results, must find a place for this ‘I’. (2005: 8)  
 
October 2015 
In Practising Ethics: Positionality, Spatiality and Subjectivity in Dialogue a 
conference I organized for PhD students doing practice-led research, we explored 
some of the more general ethical principles drawn from medicine that universities use 
as guiding principles for working with human subjects, such as ‘informed consent’, 
‘confidentiality’, and ‘benefit not harm’. Drawing on their own experiences as 
students, supervisors, practitioners and researchers, speakers from geography, 
psychoanalysis, ethnography/anthropology, political science, architectural design 
and the visual/performing arts offered a more nuanced understanding of the 
possible spatial, cultural and political settings involved in conversing and engaging 
with others and drew out questions around the positions we take up when speaking 
and listening. They examined how these actions of communication are informed by 
the psychic structures of subject-object relations, and the dynamics of power and 
knowledge around speech and sight, that vary according to practice and discipline.17  
 
Parrhesia  
In the autumn of 1983, Foucault gave six lectures at the University of California, 
Berkeley exploring the practice of parrhesia in the Greek culture of the fourth and 
fifth centuries BC. He examined the evolution of the term with respect to rhetoric, 
politics, and philosophy, and investigating the link between parrhesia and concepts of 
frankness, truth, danger, criticism, and duty. Foucault summarises his thinking from 
the first few lectures as follows:  
 
parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific 
relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life 
through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people 
through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a 
specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More 
precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his 
personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes 
truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as 
himself). (1999: np)  
 
October 2015 
UCL is still accepting funds from BHP Billiton, but last week we hosted the first 
meeting of a new informal research network of UCL academic researchers and 
practitioners – with public engagement partner, the London Mining Network – 
exploring the ecological, economic, political, psychological, social and 
spatial impacts of mining on individuals and communities, not only the physical and 
material sites of the mines themselves, but also the constellation of sites of production 
associated with them – real, represented and imagined. Our speakers, invited to the 
UK by the London Mining Network and the Colombian Solidarity Campaign, came to 
London to attend the BHP Billiton AGM, and to talk at various events about their first 
hand experiences of human rights issues connected with the construction and 
expansion of the Cerrejon opencast coal mine in Colombia, joint-owned by Anglo 
American, BHP Billiton and Glencore.18 We bore witness to the evidence of Samuel 
Arregoces, who is on the committee of FECONADEMIGUA, the Federation of 
Communities of African Descent Affected by Mining in La Guajira. Samuel is from the 
village of Tabaco, where a community of small-scale farmers of African descent, was 
brutally evicted in 2001 to make way for expansion of the Cerrejon opencast coal 
mine in the province of La Guajira in the far north of Colombia. The construction of 
the mine has led to the forced removal and dispersal of a number of rural 
communities, the violation of indigenous cultural values and sacred sites, including 
those of the Wayuu, and the loss of livelihood among small-scale farmers. We also 
heard from Danilo Urrea, of Friends of the Earth Colombia, and Co-ordinator of 
CENSAT (The National Center of Health, Environment and Work), who has been 
accompanying communities affected by the Cerrejon mine and investigating its social 
and environmental impacts. CENSAT is working with communities and organisations 
in La Guajira to prevent Cerrejon Coal diverting local rivers for mine expansion, and 
with many other organisations to challenge the Colombian government’s policy of 
encouraging large-scale, foreign-owned opencast mining. 
 
Bios and Logos 
Towards this later lectures on parrhesia, Foucault turns to examine the function of 
parrhesia in terms of the crisis of democratic institutions, and then moves on to 
discuss how parrhesia occurs as an activity in human relations, with respect to oneself 
and the care of the self, and in relation to others, specifically through three kinds of 
relation: individual personal, community and public life. Here Foucault talks of how, 
in the shift from a political to a Socratic or ethical form of parrhesia, the relation 
between logos, truth and courage alters to include bios, and to focus on the balance 
between bios and logos with respect to truth: 
Here, giving an account of your life, your bios, is also not to give a narrative 
of the historical events that have taken place in your life, but rather to 
demonstrate whether you are able to show that there is a relation between the 
rational discourse, the logos, you are able to use, and the way that you live. 
Socrates is inquiring into the way that logos gives form to a person's style of 
life; for he is interested in discovering whether there is a harmonic relation 
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